16th century Warfare

Warfare

The Changing Nature of Warfare in the early 16th Century

On Land

Until the 15th century armies consisted of the infantry (with swords, axes, and various other weapons for cutting and clubbing the enemy) protected by pike-men, bowmen (with crossbow or longbow), and the cavalry who had been the most highly valued units. The late 15th century saw the increased power of the infantry with the introduction of the mobile pike phalanx, initially by the Swiss mercenary forces. A massed body of foot-soldiers armed with 5 metre pikes had often successfully defended against a cavalry attack, especially when assisted by bowmen. But in the late 15th and early 16th centuries the Swiss made the phalanx manoeuvrable and capable of taking the offensive, under the right conditions. They achieved victories at Morat (June 1476), where they defeated a Burgundian army including 4,000 mounted knights¹, and at Nancy (January 1477), where Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy had been killed. The success was repeated at Novara in 1513 where they were able to continue their advance, while under attack from the French cavalry, to defeat the army of Louis XII². The pike phalanx was rapidly adopted by other armies.

Firearms had existed in medieval armies since the 14th century but it was only in the early 16th century that their power began to be fully utilised on the battlefield. The arquebus was a matchlock handgun, about 1.2 metres long, weighing about 5 kgs. It was successfully used by the Spanish troops of Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordoba, the ‘Grand Capitan’, in the campaign against Granada (1484-92). It took time to reload and often misfired, but despite these problems it added considerably to the killing power of the infantry. An arquebusier could be trained in a few days, much more quickly than a bowman³. By adding arquebusiers to the pike-men in the mobile phalanxes Cordoba defeated the much larger French army at Cerignola (1503), and the arquebus was again an important factor in the Imperialist victory at La Bicocca (1522).⁴

This combination of pike-men, swordsmen and an increasing number of arquebusiers was to form the basis of the reorganisation of the Spanish infantry into the ‘tercios’. At full strength a ‘tercios’ consisted of ten companies each of 300 men, including two made up of specialist arquebusiers⁵ who could cause high casualties and create havoc in the massed ranks of opposing pike-men or cavalry. By mid-century the Imperial armies were increasing the numbers of arquebusiers, in some cases up to 50% of the infantry, though the French and English were rather slower to adapt. The impact of this increased use of firearms was to reduce the incidence of pitched battles and offensive tactics after 1530.

The cavalry was traditionally considered to be the elite of the army, dominated as it was by the nobility and those who could afford the expense of the horses, armour and other equipment required. They were associated with the bravery, virtue and honour of the chivalrous ‘Christian knight’, and the cavalry charge was much feared on the medieval battlefield. They were not invincible - Bannockburn, Crecy and Agincourt had shown that – but they were valued so highly that one mounted knight was reckoned to be worth ten infantrymen. With the development of the mobile pike phalanx and the increasing use of the arquebus, a cavalry charge was less likely to succeed and great casualties could be inflicted upon them. Cervantes, in Don Quixote, considered firearms to be ‘An invention which allows a base and cowardly hand to take the life of a brave knight.’⁶ The cavalry still had an important role in scouting, foraging, raiding, skirmishing and following up victory by pursuing fleeing troops, but they were not the strike force that they had once been and they were very expensive. The proportion of cavalry in the ever increasing size of armies in the early 16th century was reducing. It is estimated that half of the 18,000 soldiers that Charles VIII took into Italy in 1494 were cavalry, whereas at Pavia in 1525 they made up only 25% of Francis’ 24,000 strong army.⁷

Field artillery had a part to play on the 16th century battlefield. The typical cast bronze field culverins of the time fired iron balls and used gunpowder, giving them a good range. But they had serious limitations with a slow rate of fire, limited accuracy, and lack of mobility. Weighing 1,600 kgs. or more, they were simply too heavy to move swiftly around the battlefield at critical moments, and they could be captured by enemy light cavalry unless well defended. Nevertheless they did make an important contribution to French victories at Ravenna (1512), where the Spanish cavalry were badly damaged by gun fire, and at Marignano (1515), where seventy-two culverins caused high casualties among the Swiss pike phalanxes.

Although artillery on the battlefield had serious limitations, the use of siege artillery had become a significant factor by the early 16th century. Many different sizes were cast but the ‘half cannon’ weighing up to 2,000 kgs. (a ‘cannon’ weighed up to 3600 kgs.), needing 10 or 12 horses to move them, could be manoeuvred into place during a siege, where mobility was less important than on the battlefield. The power of these weapons was such that with continual, well directed fire against the base of the walls they could create breaches through which the attacking soldiers could surge. By this time the traditional isolated medieval castle had largely lost its value, but the increasing power of the cannon meant that no city could hold out for long with walls that had been made ever higher to defend against the scaling ladders and towers. In 1519 Machiavelli wrote: ‘there is no wall whatever its thickness that artillery will not destroy in only a few days’⁸.

For a short time at the start of the century this seemed to be the case. If cities could not be defended he believed that field armies would become larger and that wars would be decided in short campaigns and decisive battles⁹. However what Machiavelli had not taken into account were the new defensive constructions, the ‘trace italienne’ sometimes known as ‘star fortifications’, which were developed during the Italian Wars of the early 16th century as a response to the new weapons of attack. Walls were lowered and thickened, from typically 2 metres at the base to 12 metres¹⁰, constructed of earth and rubble faced with brick or stone. Rather than being vertical they were sloped, the combined effect being to reduce and absorb the impact of the cannonballs.

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These developments swung the advantage back towards defence. It was now much more difficult to capture a city or fortress built in this way. A victory on the battlefield did not mean that the war was won or that territory could be secured. It had been such new defences that had enabled Rhodes to hold out for so long against vastly superior Ottoman forces in 1522. In normal circumstances the longer a city could hold out, the more difficult it became to supply the necessary food and munitions for the offensive forces. However these defences were extremely expensive to construct. Not every city could afford them or be provided with them. The spread of the ‘trace italienne’ was therefore initially restricted to strategically important cities and borders.

The costs and dangers of a prolonged siege were high on both sides. If the attacking force failed to achieve a rapid breakthrough or early surrender the only other option was to attempt to starve the city into submission. The walls had to be surrounded with sufficient troops to defend against a relieving force attempting to end the siege and against sorties by the defenders. The longer it continued the greater the cost of maintaining the large numbers of soldiers required. It also meant that those soldiers could not be deployed elsewhere. However, the cost of a siege to the defenders and inhabitants should not be underestimated. Since food was going to run short, commanders often expelled non-combatants before or during a siege so that what supplies there were could be reserved for the troops. Houses and other buildings outside or adjacent to the walls were pulled down, since they would provide cover for the attackers. If the siege was ultimately successful it was usual for the victorious troops to be given three days of looting as a reward, at an enormous cost in lives and property to the residents.

Who was in these armies? Sometimes kings and princes led their armies. Charles V, Francis I, Henry VIII and Suleiman were all actively engaged in campaigns at some point in their reign. They stood to gain honour and enhance their reputation, but there was always the risk of defeat, capture or even death. It was usually more experienced noblemen who commanded on the field of battle, though sometimes mercenary commanders were bought in for a campaign. The cavalry were usually from the upper strata of society. While the nobility were expected to fight for their king and others volunteered in the hope of wealth or glory, the majority of soldiers were mercenaries. The time of feudal service to the lord had passed. There were no permanent, standing national armies in western Europe. Many rulers had serious reservations about having a body of well-armed local men close to home. They could not be relied upon to put down internal unrest and could themselves pose a major threat to the authority of the ruler – most knew their Roman history!

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Whereas newly raised soldiers often had little training before being thrown into battle, mercenaries were trained, professional, well-armed units. They were contracted for a specific period or the duration of a campaign and could usually be relied upon to follow orders, so long as they were paid regularly and had the expectation of plunder when successful. The fact that many units had existed for years meant that there was a comradeship that made them all the more effective on the battlefield. The downside was that if there was no money to pay them, you would not have an army. If they were left unpaid then the commanders could lose control and the consequences were unpredictable, as was clearly demonstrated in the 1527 ‘Sack of Rome’.

The dangers that all those involved in warfare were exposed to meant that some reward was expected. As armies in the 16th century became larger the costs escalated. The pay of soldiers was increasing. It is difficult to generalise; some troops were valued more than others. An experienced infantryman in 1520 was paid about 3 ducats per month, rather more for arquebusiers, rather less for pike-men. By 1550 their pay was 5.5 ducats per month on campaign and 4.3 ducats on winter garrison duty¹². The cavalry were paid considerably more, reflecting the additional costs of providing their own equipment. These were not high rates of pay, comparing unfavourably with that of a labourer. It is also doubtful whether the increases even matched the level of inflation that occurred in the same period. What must have tempted many, besides adventure, glory, despair or comradeship, were the hopes of booty from looting or the ransom of important prisoners.

Wars have always been very expensive. It was not always easy to get the money to the right place at the right time. Most rulers needed to have a secure source of revenue to be able to guarantee payment to the troops. This might be from their ordinary revenue, or subsidies voted for by representative bodies if they believed their own interests were at stake, but more often it was borrowed against future revenues or promised by allies. But an army needs more than just pay to survive. It needs weapons, medical care, but most of all food. The larger the army, the greater the logistical problems to be overcome. An army of 45,000 was larger than all but the greatest cities of the day. Even a force of 10,000 was larger than most towns¹³ which would have its established system of supply and distribution.

Such a system had to be created for an army on the move. Tons of bread, thousands of gallons of beer and hundreds of animals were needed daily. All this, along with other equipment, could only be moved by 1000’s of draught animals which in turn required vast amounts of fodder and water. In ‘home’ territory, administrators could organise large scale contracts with merchants to supply what was needed or a system of compulsory requisitioning of food supplies at a set price was used. On campaign such methods rarely worked. The campaigning season was generally considered to be from March to October because of the difficulty of feeding an army in winter. Any attempt to extend this usually ended badly. While occupying a town for a short time supplies might be brought from local merchants. For longer periods or while on the move this broke down under the weight of demand.

What then took over was foraging, wide scale plundering in which troops took what they could for themselves and their colleagues. This was accepted practice. Francis I had explained in 1521 to the English ambassador that: ‘I will march on straight and live upon my enemies’ countries, as they have done on mine’¹⁴. The inhabitants were subjected to the demands of any army which was passing through or, even worse, staying on their land. While there, they would take what they needed or wanted; when leaving, it was not uncommon for the troops to destroy the economic resources of the area, mills, bakeries, crops in the field, in order to deprive the enemy of their future use. On occasions troops carried out the deliberate destruction of resources in their own territory as they withdrew, as the French did in Provence in 1536, so that the advancing army would eventually run out of supplies.¹⁵

At Sea

The key vessel in the Mediterranean in the 16th century, has it had been for centuries, was the war galley. Whilst having masts and able to use sail, in raids and battles it was the use of oars that gave them their particular value. The galley was relatively slender and low, with a shallow draught, fast and manoeuvrable, to some extent independent of adverse currents and moderate weather conditions. Galleys could stay close in to the shore and be run up on beaches for raids and for the collection of fresh water. Artillery could be mounted on the bows and be fired directly ahead from close to the waterline. However, it was prone to capsize in stormy weather so its campaigning season was usually limited to between March and October, and it could not travel large distances without collecting fresh water for the rowing crew. It depended on a regular supply of manpower, since mortality rates were high in the galleys even when not in battle. The men in the Ottoman galleys were often conscripted from their territories, but they, like the Christian fleets, also used prisoners of war, convicts and slaves captured on raids which were often planned for that purpose.

Such raids were a constant threat to the population of the Mediterranean lands. The Ottoman fleet under Barbarossa regularly pillaged coastal settlements in Italy, Spain and the Mediterranean islands, while vessels commanded by the Knights of St John, from their bases in Rhodes and then Malta, were just as ruthless in their attacks on Muslim shipping whether commercial or en route to mecca. Loses from storms and the occasional sea battle were high but well organised shipyards, such as those in Venice (the Arsenale) and Galata on the Golden Horn in Istanbul, were able to replace them at a remarkable rate. In the early 16th century the Venetian shipyard employed 16,000 people and could produce galleys at a rate of almost one a day using assembly line techniques.

There were usually between 100 and 150 rowers in each galley. The large Venetian galleys of the mid-sixteenth century had 24 rowing benches with 3 rowers on each bench, on both sides of the ship – 144 rowers in all. Most were chained to their benches, supplied with minimal food and water, allowed little sleep and when in proximity to the enemy driven with whips. If they survived such treatment they could well succumb to disease which thrived in the insanitary conditions on board. The galley was little better than a sewer. It is said that they could be smelt two miles off and the most effective way to cleanse them and remove the filth and rats was to sink the hull periodically.¹⁶

Major sea battles were relatively rare. Both sides had too much to lose, not just in terms of vessels but defeat would also mean the removal of naval defences for large expanses of the coastline and most commanders were not willing to risk this. The Christian fleets usually consisted of galleys from a number of different states – Spain, Venice, Genoa, the Knights of St. John – often rivals. While most were prepared to see their allies lose vessels they did not wish to lose their own! Therefore smaller scale skirmishes were more common. None were welcome to those on the rowing benches. When in conflict the galley slaves could expect death from being blasted by cannon fire, drowning if their ship was holed at or below the waterline, or being crushed in collision with an enemy vessel.

How were battles won in the early 16th century? The tactics of the generals in the field played a significant role, but so too did the changing nature of warfare in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, and how effectively armies and their commanders adapted to these developments. A closer look at three battles help to show how these factors influenced the outcome of specific campaigns.

The Battle of Pavia 1525– provides an example of the tactics employed and the use of the different components of a sixteenth century army.

The siege of Florence October 1529 - August 1530 – shows the difficulties of storming a well defended city, as well as the logistical and financial problems of both besiegers and the besieged.

The Battle of Preveza 1538 - off the coast of Greece - reveals the advantages of the galley and the importance of a united force.

The Battle of Pavia

The siege of Florence

The Battle of Preveza